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1. My work in aesthetics began in the 1960s, at a time
when the prevailing conception of the subject was remarkably
constricted. The limitations under which aesthetics laboured,
which today are not easily imagined, came from two different
sources: one more general, the other more particular.
In the flrst place, aesthetics, in line with what was held to be
true of any branch of philosophy, was conceived of as an
exclusively second-order activity. But, in those days, 'second-
order' had, in the context of philosophy, a special meaning:
it meant something close to meta-linguistic. For it was
definitive of philosophy that the first-order activity upon
which it, or any branch of it, was reflexive was a form of
discourse. So the question arose, what was the discourse upon
which aesthetics was reflexive? Where did its subject matter
come from?
At this point, the second limitation upon aesthetics came
into play. For if aesthetics was required to take on the general
form of philosophy, its particular features or the key to its
subject matter derived from the assimilation of aesthetics to
another branch of philosophy, in which, it was widely
believed, much progress had been made: moral philosophy as
it was currently conceived. What aesthetics and moral
philosophy were held to have in common was that both
concerned themselves with value - that is, with the language
of value - and where they differed was in the kind of value
with which they were concerned. Moral philosophy
concerned itself with the language of moral value, aesthetics
with the language of aesthetic value. However, subject matter
apart, the methods of the two branches of philosophy were
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expected to coincide, and thus the branches themselves to run
parallel to one another.
This analogy imposed upon aesthetics a twofold task. Like
moral philosophy, it had to pick out the judgement that
enjoyed pride of place within the discourse of value it
surveyed. Then it had to provide an analysis of this
judgement. As to the judgement itself, it equated this with the
judgement of taste, or what was asserted by sentences of the
form, 'X is beautiful'.
2. One way of thinking about this programme for
aesthetics is to think of what it promoted, and, to help one
out. there was a body of literature - certainly not big, but
sizeable - constructed around this programme and
exhibiting to a high degree what John Passmore, in the title
that he gave to a famous article, called 'the dreariness of
aesthetics,.1 Another way of thinking about the programme,
which was not in favour at the time, was to think of what it
inhibited. As I wrote in Art and its Objects,l it was this
negative aspect of contemporary aesthetics that increasingly
disturbed me. Indeed, it is a significant fact about Art and its
Objects that it was a commissioned book: left to myself, I
might, out of love of art, have continued as I had until then.
and never have written a word in aesthetics.
What was missing from aesthetics could be summarized as
follows: in the first place, the fundamental distinction between
works of nature and works of art was neglected. Secondly,
this neglect was ensured by two further facts: the artist
dropped out of the picture, and the spectator was of interest
solely for an attitude of his, which ranged over art and nature
indifferently. Thirdly, the attitude in question took in only
the beauty of the work, and, the better to do this, it required
the spectator to approach the work with a blank mind. All
other responses of the spectator, and specifically all non-
evaluative responses, were treated as things that aesthetics
could ignore. And, finally, of the spectator's response to the
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beauty of what was before him, the only aspects that counted
were those which received linguistic formulation.
If this was the way the wind blew, Art and its Objects was
built to sail directly against it.
3. Without any desire to overlook whatever other claims
there might be upon aesthetics, I felt that place needed to be
found within the subject for something that could be
plausibly thought of as the philosophy of art. Nor did it seem
to me that anything deserving of this name could be
exclusively, or even primarily, a study of the spectator's
judgement of taste: it must also include the spectator's
judgement of interest. If that was so, the agent or artist could
no longer be ignored, for it was due to his activity that
aesthetics, in its new-found sense, had a subject matter at all.
And, finally, if progress were to be made with this subject
matter, aesthetics would have to abandon the methodology
imposed upon it by a general conception of philosophy. It
could no longer afford to be exclusively 'linguistic' in either
of two very different senses of that term, which had somehow
coalesced. It could no longer take as its sole subject matter
language or discourse. It must broaden its subject matter, and,
once it had done so, it could not restrict its method of inquiry
to linguistic analysis.
With hindsight, it is now apparent that, judged even by its
own standards, post-war philosophy imposed upon aesthetics
grotesque constraints. The analogy with moral philosophy
could never lead to the conclusion that the analysis of 'X is
beautiful' supplied the core of aesthetics. For, if moral
philosophy was to pass any test of material adequacy, it, too,
would have to lay claim to a subject matter that went beyond
a mere body of human discourse: it would have to take on a
whole reach of human activity and achievement, rich in
psychological considerations, in which expression,
perception, and the acceptance of reality were intricately
woven together. To do this, it could not confine itself to the
standpoint of the moral judge or critic: at least as significant
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was the standpoint of the moral agent. And, in so far as the
moral judge deserved attention, it was unrealistic to maintain
that the only thing important about him was the judgement
he came out with, and its analysis. An adequate moral
philosophy could no more be exclusively linguistic in either
of the two senses I have tried to isolate than an adequate
philosophy of art.
4. If Art and its Objects set out to give a philosophical
account of art as such, in Painting as an Art,) which came out
of lectures that I delivered at the National Gallery of Art at
Washington in 1984, a very different moment for aesthetics, I
tried to offer a philosophical account of one particular art:
the art of painting. The two books were thus complementary
in subject matter, and so were their methodologies.
Aesthetics, both in its broad scope as the study of art in
general and in its narrower scope as the study of this or that
art, I see as applied rather than pure philosophy. Accord-
ingly, Art and its Objects and Painting as an Art are equally
works in applied philosophy. My justification for saying this
is that both books, and the branch of philosophy to which
they belong, assume, over and above the general activities of
the mind, certain particular forms of thinking, certain
particular forms of intentional activity, through which
persons, or the bearers of mind, engage with some special
aspect of the contingent world. And here is one reason why
aesthetics - and, for that matter, moral philosophy, and social
philosophy, and the philosophy of science, all of which I see
as applied philosophy - cannot exclusively rely on
conceptual analysis. Art, morality, science, are not spun out
of the mere structure of our thinking.
However, if both books are works in applied philosophy,
there is a difference between them, which corresponds to a
difference, first within aesthetics, then. more generally. within
applied philosophy. For the later book. Painting as an Art, is
a work in what I have come to see as 'substantive
philosophy'. Substantive philosophy includes. in addition to
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the philosophy of the individual arts, such subjects as the
philosophy of quantum mechanics, the philosophy of law,
medical ethics, environmental ethics, and the difference is that
substantive philosophy pursues forms of thought, forms of
action, that are much more implicated with contingent
features of the world. In doing so, it goes deeper into the
historical development of the activities it studies, and how trial
and error have made them what they are. In Painting as an
Art, having at the beginning of the book laid down the
general conditions by which the painter can generate
meaning from the application of pigment to a support, I then
went on to consider how different painters, with different
aims and ambitions, having in mind different sorts of
meaning with which they wished to emblazon the surfaces
they marked, entered into somewhat different struggles with
their chosen medium.
But what should be clear is that all these distinctions within
philosophy - applied against pure, substantive against
applied - are only approximate. They are ways of
classifying different forms of inquiry, and of describing
certain salient differences between them, but they explain
little, and there is a point at which they cease to repay
examination.
5. Certainly for me more interesting than the differences
between the philosophy of art as such and the philosophy of
this or that art have been the relations between art and the
arts, and the nature of the network that used to be called 'the
system of the arts'. How does the unity of art accommodate
itself to the diversity of the individual arts? Do the individual
arts reiterate, each in its own way, the general characteristics
of art, or is it that art itself is simply a construct out of the
individual arts?
In this case, the answer, it seems to me, must lie where it
seldom does: in the middle. I do not believe that anyone
could doubt either that there are certain general
characteristics of art or that what distinguishes the arts are
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matters of real importance both to the theory and to the
practice of art. Tension arises because there is no principium
individuationis for the different arts. The arts differ one from
another, but in no one respect, and, in consequence, when the
general characteristics of art trickle down to anyone
particular art, they have been filtered through what is peculiar
to that art with the result that they are recognizable only with
skill.
In Painting as an Art I was particularly engaged with one
broad characteristic of art, and with how that characteristic is
realized in painting: that is, 'meaning' as this attaches to
particular works of art. And 'meaning' means what we grasp
when we understand the work of art: when we understand the
work itself, as opposed to why the work came into being, or
any other fact about it. The meaning of a work of art
occupies what I have called the judgement of interest.
The meaning of a work of art, I had claimed in Art and its
Objects, is iconic. Nowadays, I would prefer to put this by
saying that the meaning of a work of art is experiential, and
in Painting as an Art I developed this point into the more
particular thesis that the meaning of a pictorial work of art is
visual, which, I take it, is some large part of the view that
painting is an essentially visual art.
6. That the meaning of pictures is visual can be established
through the convergence of three lines of thought.
In the first place, there is the broad contrast between how
we grasp pictorial meaning and how we grasp linguistic
meaning. Think of a painting that represents a bison
standing, and put beside it either the word 'Bison', or the
sentence 'The bison is standing'. (It is perhaps a significant
fact that we do not know which of the two fragments of
language - the noun or the sentence - is the more
appropriate parallel to the picture.) Now understanding the
fragment of language is a process that is reconstructable as an
essentially two-stage process. Stage one consists in using our
eyes to see the marks on the surface: stage two consists in
12
Wol/heim
applying to the marks the rules or conventions of the
language to which the marks belong. If we do not know the
language, we shall be able to complete stage one, but will be
held up by stage two. If we now tum to the picture, and try to
understand it, this process is reconstructable as an essentially
one-stage process. We - that is to say. the suitably sensitive,
suitably informed spectator - will look at the picture, using
the appropriate mode of perception, and drawing upon the
needed information, and we shall go on looking at it until we
come to understand it, and, from beginning to end, from our
first sight of it to the moment when we grasp its meaning,
what we subject the picture to forms a seamless whole.
That linguistic understanding is a two-stage process and
pictorial understanding a one-stage process is underwritten
by the difference in the way in which requisite knowledge
enters into the two processes. For it enters into both. In the
language case, a highly specific cache of knowledge -
knowledge of the relevant natural language - erupts into our
attempt to understand a linguistic fragment, and, when it does
so, its effect is to transform radically how we stand to it: so
abruptly that we can think of it as segmenting the process of
understanding. In the picture case, by contrast, a diffuse
amount of knowledge seeps into the process of pictorial
understanding, it is undisclosed when it does so, and its effect
is invariably incremental.
Secondly, the differences between the two processes of
understanding are further secured when we concentrate on
what it is that allows us to do one of them; when, that is, we
concentrate on the visual capacity that we have and that we
draw upon when, standing in front of a painting of a bison,
we identify the painting as of a bison. I call this visual
capacity 'seeing-in', and it is its distinctive phenomenology
that warrants attention. The experiences that manifest this
capacity exhibit what I call 'twofoldness', in that the
adequately sensitive, adequately informed spectator will at
once notice the marked surface and be visually aware of the
represented animal. Twofoldness is a matter of a single
experience with two aspects: one of which I call
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configurational, the other I call recognitionaI. Twofoldness is
not a matter of two experiences. It is not a matter of two
simultaneous experiences, as I once maintained, for someone
who has seen many bisons and many marked walls, has, on
first seeing a representation of a bison on a wall, a new kind
of experience rather than a new composite of familiar
experiences. Nor is twofoldness a matter of two successive
experiences, as Ernst Gombrich has felt obliged to claim - a
position he got himself into because he thought that, standing
in front of any picture and claiming to see the canvas at the
same time as seeing what the canvas depicts is like standing in
front of the duck/rabbit picture and claiming to see the duck
at the same time as seeing the rabbit. Since the second pair of
visual experiences are incompatible: Gombrich erroneously
concluded that the first pair are too. But. since the
incompatibility of seeing the duck and seeing the rabbit is an
incompatibility within representation, it cannot be used,
without further argument, to establish an incompatability
across representation: that is, between seeing the representing
surface and seeing the represented object.
I have said in the past that the recognitional aspect of
seeing a bison in a picture cannot be directly compared with
seeing a bison face-to-face. We cannot. starting with the
picture, somehow, by a process of subtraction and addition,
each step involving no more than a phenomenological
change. work our way backward to seeing the animal itself,
nor vice versa. Doing either is no more possible than filling
in the changes that would take us from hearing a tune in our
head to hearing that same tune in a concert-hall. Nevertheless
- and this is something that I have never wished to deny -
seeing a bison in a picture has something in common with
seeing a bison face-to-face. I suggest two components that
occur in each: one is the thought of a bison, the other is the
appearance of the bison. I believe that these links justify us in
saying that seeing a bison in a surface is also a case of seeing




If the foregoing is true, then we have a deeper insight into
the difference between understanding a sentence about a
bison and understanding a picture of a bison: one requires,
but the other does not, an experience of a bison. And, since
the experience in question is a visual experience, this in turn
establishes that pictorial meaning is visual. We understand
pictures of something or other through seeing that thing,
moreover through seeing that thing in them.
Thirdly, there are two further psychological phenomena,
on which there is general agreement, but the significance of
which is often lost upon theorists of representation. These
phenomena confirm the fact that, when we recognize what a
picture is of, we do so by seeing that thing. The first
phenomenon, which I call 'transfer', is this: if I can under-
stand a picture as being of a dog, and I know what a cat looks
like, then, in ordinary circumstances, I shall recognize a
picture of a cat for what it is. The second phenomenon,
which is a correlate of the first, is this: if I don't already know
what a cat looks like, I can, again in ordinary circumstances,
learn this from being shown a picture of a cat and, at the
same, being time told that this is what it is. It is because, in
being told that I am looking at a picture of a cat, I am in
effect also being told that I am looking at a cat, that the
lesson works and the world (and not just the world of
pictures) enlarges for me. At one point in The Languages of
Art,5 Nelson Goodman tries to persuade the reader that the
classification of pictures into unicorn-pictures, man-pictures,
and Pickwick-pictures, is like classifying furniture into desks,
tables, and chair, or (the same point) that 'unicorn' makes as
large a semantic contribution to our understanding of what a
unicorn picture is as 'corn' does to our understanding of
what a corncob pipe is. It should be apparent that, if
Goodman were right, neither of the two phenomena just
considered would hold.
I have said that, if one common component of seeing a
bison face-to-face and seeing a bison in a picture is the visual
experience of a bison; another is the thought of a bison. I
now tum to the second component, for it is only if we
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understand the second component appropriately that we shall
understand the first component adequately. This will involve
something of a detour.
7. In saying that both seeing a bison face-to-face and
seeing a bison on a picture contain the thought of a bison, I
could have made this more precise by saying that both kinds
of experience are permeated by the thought of a bison. What
the word 'permeate' does is that it makes clear that, in the
case of both experiences, the thought is not a mere
accompaniment to the experience. The thought, in each case,
structures the experience; I see according to the thought.
I now want to develop this point in the context of seeing-
in. For if we combine the permeability by thought of seeing-
in with an appreciation of the variety of thought that can
permeate seeing-in, then, and only then, shall we get a true
estimate of the range of seeing-in, hence of the range of
pictorial meaning. (And, once we have done this, we could -
though this would go beyond my present concern - tum the
argument back on itself. For if it turns out that the expanded
view of the range of pictorial meaning has much to
recommend it independently, then the fact that this expanded
range can best be explained through the range of seeing-in
would do much to reinforce the connection between what can
be seen in a picture and what that picture means.)
First, then, the variety of thought, or the range of thoughts,
that can permeate seeing-in. In everything that I have said to
date about seeing-in, I have taken it for granted that seeing-
in, like seeing face-to-face, can be permeated by general, or
non-referential, thoughts. It is this fact that allows me, in
pictures, as in real life, not only to see things of a particular
kind, but to see them as of that particular kind. In seeing a
man or a woman in a picture, I can see the man as a man, the
woman as a woman. Another way of putting this is to say that
within seeing-in recognitional skills can be deployed.
And now I want to add the claim that seeing-in, again like
seeing face-to-face, can be permeated by individual, or
16
Wollheim
referential, thoughts. It is this further fact that allows me, in
pictures, as in real life, not only to see things of a particular
kind, but to see particular things, and not only to see
particular things, but to see them as the particular things that
they are. In seeing Napoleon or Madame Moitessier, Ingres's
model, in a picture, I can see Napoleon as Napoleon, Madame
Moitessier as Madame Moitessier. Seeing-in finds room for
the deployment of identificatory skills as well as for the
deployment of recognitional skills.
I now want to correlate the larger scope of seeing-in with a
certain breadth of representational meaning, not infrequently
observed, but regularly left unexplained. This breadth of
representational meaning can also be thought of in terms of a
difference within representational meaning: a difference that
might initially be expressed as that between representations of
things of a particular kind, and representations of particular
things. However, this way of putting the matter will not do,
for, whereas - and this is where pictures take us into strange
territory - some representations of things of a particular
kind are not representations of particular things, every
representation of a particular thing is also a representation of
a thing of a particular kind. Accordingly, the difference we
are after is one between representations of things merely of a
particular kind and representations of particular things. So we
can set beside Ingres' s portrait of Madame Moitessier, who
was herself a particular woman - hence his portrait is a
picture of a particular woman, as well as a picture of a woman
of a particular kind - Manet's La Prune. Now this picture
represents a young shopgirl, who is on the look-out to
supplement her meagre salary with what she can derive from
the favours of men, and dresses the part, but, for all the
specificity of detail in which she is displayed, this picture
does not, in addition to representing a woman of a particular
kind, a grisette. represent a particular woman. Manet's
painting is a painting of a woman merely of a particular kind.
Similarly we can set beside Uccello's depiction of the Rout of
San Romano, which was a particular battle, Wouverman' s
Cavalry Battle, which represents a skirmish, fought at dusk
between evenly equipped horsemen, some with guns, some
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with sabres, but which, for all its detail, is no particular
skirmish. Uccello's painting is a painting of a particular
event, whereas Wouverman's painting is a painting of an
event merely of a particular kind.
How are we to account for this difference in meaning?
More particularly, can this difference be explained in
exclusively experiential or visual terms, as I have been
implying that it should be, given that we are talking about
pictorial meaning? I believe that it can be, and furthermore
that we have the materials for doing so to hand.
But let me introduce what I believe to be the right
explanation through what I believe to be a subtly wrong
explanation, and to which I may, at some moment, have given
some credence. For we might think that the difference
between the two kinds of representation, and the nature of
each, can be explained by pointing to the fact that, when we
are told, 'This is a picture of a woman', 'This is a picture of a
battle'. we can, in the case of one kind of representation, but
not in the case of the other kind, meaningfully ask, 'Which
woman?'. 'Which battle?'. where this question is understood
in a certain way. However, though this is perfectly correct, it
is no kind of explanation of the difference: for what it tells us
is something that is a consequence of the difference, for
which the explanation is therefore to be found elsewhere. I
say this because what we can correctly say, or ask, in front of
the two kinds of picture can only be a consequence of the
difference between the two kinds of picture, for that
difference must lie in what can correctly be seen in each.
What then I propose as the real explanation of the
difference is that, with one kind of picture. we are, in the
course of trying to see what we can see in its surface, required
to bring to bear recognitional and identificatory skills,
whereas. with the other kind of picture, we can see all that it is




8. 'Required to bring to bear', 'correctly seen in a
surface' - where have these ideas, these normative ideas,
suddenly come from?
It is a happy consequence of considering the distinction
between pictures of particular things and pictures of things
merely of a particular kind that we are led straight to the one
element still missing from my account of pictorial meaning.
Seeing-in precedes representation: it precedes representation,
both logically and historically. Logically, in that we can see
things in surfaces that neither are nor are thought by us to be
representations. We can see in a frozen pane of glass dancers
in gauze dresses, and we can see in a stained wall in Chicago a
boy holding a mysterious box. Historically, in that our distant
ancestors could engage in such games long before they
thought of decorating the caves they lived in with images of
the animals they hunted. The significance of the logical point
is that it allows us to define representation by reference to
seeing-in without circularity. The significance of the
historical point is that it leads us 10 grasp what changed when
representation appeared on the scene.
If we identify the origin of representation with the moment
when people started to mark surfaces so that others (and
themselves) could be led to see this rather than that in them,
then we can think that what representation did to seeing-in
was that it imposed upon it something that it had thus far
done without: a standard of correctness. It is correct to see in
an anonymous sixteenth-century portrait Henry VIII, and
not, as old film buffs will be inclined to do, Charles
Laughton: it will be correct to see in the famous double
portrait of Ghirlandaio an old man with a polyp at the end of
his nose, and not, as Proust used to pretend to do on his visits
to the Louvre, his worldly friend from the Jockey Club, the
Marquis du Lau. But in frozen panes of glass, in stained walls,
it is all right to see what we choose, and, with Rorschach tests,
the only error - though it is more of a failing than an error
- is to see nothing rather than something. A standard of
correctness reconciles what might otherwise be two
incompatible lines of thought: that what a picture is of is
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dependent upon what can be seen in it, and that a picture is
not of everything that can be seen in it.
The immediate relevance of the standard of correctness to
the discussion in hand is this: that, in saying, as I just did, that
some representations require only recognitional skills,
whereas others also call for identificatory skills, I was
implicitly appealing to a standard, a complex standard, of
correctness.
But, if one question is thereby resolved, another is posed:
what is the source, or ground, of a standard of correctness for
pictorial perception? The best answer, I believe, is that the
standard is set - set anew for each painting - by the
intentions of the artist, subject to two provisos. First of all,
'intention' must be taken to refer to, not some fiat on the
artist's part, but the range of psychological factors that
caused him to work as he did. Secondly, these intentions must
be fulfilled if they are to determine how the picture is to be
understood: and an intention of the artist's is fulfilled if and
only if, as the intention finds an outlet for itself on the canvas,
the spectator is able to see in the deposited marks what the
artist intended to convey. Unfulfilled intentions make no
direct contribution to what the work means, though it will
always be interesting to an interpreter to know of such
failures. No artist can make his work mean some particular
thing simply by intending it to. And that his audience
recognizes his intention makes no relevant difference; nor,
for that matter, would the further fact that he knew that his
audience would. Once again, it is the eyes that settle the issue.
From this last point it follows that the way in which a
standard of correctness operates for pictures further
underlines the difference between pictorial and linguistic
meaning on which I have been labouring. Let us go back to
the sentence 'The bison is standing', and now imagine that it
is a newcomer to the language. In that case, a standard of
linguistic correctness would be completely unfettered as to
the semantic interpretation it imposed on the sentence. But
take a would-be picture of a bison: here no standard of
correctness would be acceptable if the interpretation it
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proposed fell outside what a suitably sensitive, suitably
informed spectator could see in it. And, in talking of what a
spectator could see in a picture, I must be understood as
leaving room enough for this possibility: that some
spectators, prior to the moment when they are told what there
is to be seen in the picture, just couldn't see it, but, as with the
buried pictures of childhood. having once been told what
there is there to see, then can see it. How much prompting the
eyes of the spectator need is irrelevant. provided only that this
prompting effects what he sees, not just what he says. An
example from high art that makes my point is the
anamorphic skull that lies under the table in Holbein's The
Ambassadors. for few spectators would recognize it for what
it is unless they were told.
A standard of correctness may - and The Ambassadors
would be a case in point - tell us that we need to see more in
a picture than we would be naturally inclined to see. However
a standard of correctness can also tell us - and pictures of
things merely of a particular kind would be a case in point -
that we should see less in a picture than we would naturally be
inclined to. But all such injunctions are idle, they do nothing
to establish meaning, unless the eyes can comply with them.
9. Of recent years some philosophers have found it
unsatisfactory that the phenomenology of seeing-in should
be left as unspecified as I have been prepared to do. In
particular they have wanted greater clarification on the
relation between seeing face-to-face and what I have called
the recognitional aspect of seeing-in, and they have been
unhappy to be told that the two are incommensurate. For that
reason, they have resurrected the idea of resemblance as
foundational to representation. We find this project in the
work of three thinkers of great subtlety - Christopher
Peacocke, Malcolm Budd, and Rob Hopkins6 - but it is my
hope that I can avoid going into the detail of the argument
(or arguments, I should say) just because I believe that any
attempt to explain seeing-in through resemblance can only
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establish something other than what is aimed at. It gives an
account, not of seeing-in, but of something else.
But it is important at the outset to recognize that there are
three distinct roles that the notion of resemblance, or looking
like, might play in an account of seeing-in. So the claim
might be that
(one) for me to be able to see x in y, y must look like x
(in some respect), even though I don't notice it; or
(two), for me to be able to see x in y, I must notice that
x looks like y (in some respect), or I must see x as looking
like y; or
(three), my seeing x in y is just my seeing y as looking
like x (in some respect).
The first proposes resemblance as a condition of seeing-in.
The second proposes perceived resemblance as a condition of
seeing-in. The third proposes an identity of seeing-in and a
perception of resemblance. It is evident that it is onfy when
resemblance takes on the third of these three roles that it
claims to have something to tell us about the phenomenology
of seeing-in. So long as it is cast in one or other of the first
two roles, it leaves completely open what it is like to see x in
y.
So what of the claim that my seeing x in y is just my seeing
y as looking like x in some respect?
Now let us first clear the ground by reminding ourselves of
a distinction that Wittgenstein makes in the Philosophical
Investigations between two different kinds of situation in
which we might be struck by the resemblance between two
faces. 7 One is when both faces are present to us, and we are
struck by the match: the other is when only one face is
present, and it summons up the thought of the other. The
relevance of Wittgenstein' s distinction is that it is obviously
only the second kind of case, and its phenomenology, that
could conceivably have anything to tell us about the
phenomenology of seeing-in, for pictorial representation in
absence is the standard case. We can go further: it would be
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highly imprudent if we brought into our account of seeing-in
any consideration suggested to us by the situation where we
note the resemblance between two objects that are both
before us.
The burden of my argument against any analysis of seeing
x in y by starting from (for the same values of x and y) seeing
y as looking like x is that it in effect reverts to the idea that
the distinctive phenomenology of our perception of pictures
is given, not by the notion of seeing-in (to which lip-service is
being paid), but by the notion of seeing-as. Indeed this
barely lies below the surface. For seeing y as looking like x is
a variant of seeing y as x. And I believe that this project is
doomed because it simultaneously gives too much attention
to seeing y and too little attention to seeing x in the overall
account of what goes on experientially when we look at a
pictorial representation of x. However, I shall not rely on the
general argument against seeing-as, but shall concentrate on
the project before us of understanding representational
seeing in terms of seeing y as looking like x.
But, first, a word on what might be called the minor flaw in
this project. I have laboured the point before', and it is this:
when we look at a picture that represents x, there will be many
cases where we can circumscribe that part of the surface in
which x is represented. But there will be other cases where we
can't. When Turner depicts a ship labouring in the aftermath
of a prolonged storm, we can point to where the ship is
represented, but we cannot point to where the aftermath of
the prolonged storm is represented. In other words,
localization is not a general requirement upon representation.
But this is not a problem so long as representation is to be
understood in terms of seeing-in, for, as the very phrase
'seeing x in a surface' makes clear, seeing-in does not insist
on localization. But this changes when representation is to be
understood in terms of seeing the surface as looking like x.
For that phrase is unintelligible, and the corresponding
activity is inchoate, unless a particular part of the surface that
looks like x can be indicated. The minor flaw in an account
of seeing-in in terms of a perceived resemblance between
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surface and object is that it commits the theory of
representation to an otherwise unmotivated requirement of
localization.
So to the major flaw. It is that, as I have said, if we persist
in analyzing x's representing y in terms of seeing (some part
of) y as looking like x, we shall distort the roles both of
represented object and of representing surface in the
complex visual phenomenon of seeing a pictorial
representation. The suggested analysis gives at once
insufficient prominence to the former, or the represented
object, and excessive prominence to the latter, or the
representing surface.
In the first place, seeing y as looking like x gives
insufficient prominence to seeing x. For we have seen that
seeing a representation of x has two components in common
with seeing x face-to-face: the thought of x, and the visual
experience of x. But all that seeing y as looking like x
requires is the thought of x or, perhaps not even that, but just
the thought of x's appearance. What seeing y as looking like
x does not require is a visual experience of x: it would be
absurd to claim that seeing y as looking like x was a mode of
seeing x. Secondly, seeing y as looking like x gives excessive
prominence to y. For, when we look at y. and y is a
representation of x, we are certainly required to be aware of y
- this is a point that I have insisted on as against illusionistic,
or quasi-illusionistic, accounts of representation - but it is
not a primary feature of the situation that new aspects of y
start to dawn upon us. If new aspects of y do dawn upon us,
this is so largely in that they contribute to what is the central
element in the phenomenology of seeing x in y: namely, the
way in which x emerges out of y.
In insisting that seeing-in, as opposed to seeing-as, or, for
that matter, seeing-as-looking-like, is central to the analysis of
the perception of representations, it is not my point that
seeing-in and seeing-as are completely disjoint perceptual
activities, or that seeing-as enjoys no place within an account
of representation. On the contrary, for as I understand the
matter, seeing-as occupies a niche within seeing-in. But what
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this niche is needs careful disentangling thus: when I see x in
y, I look at a marked surface y, I see something in it, and on
to that something I bring to bear, as we have seen, either just a
recognitional skill or a recognitional skill plus an ident-
ificatory skill. In other words, I see what I see in the surface
either as a mere thing of a particular kind or as a particular
thing. However, this way in which seeing-as lurks within
seeing-in does nothing to show that seeing-as has any
foundational role in the explanation of representation. And
that is because what I see as this or as that, as just a woman or
as Madame Moitessier, is itself an artifact of representation; it
is the represented object, not the representing surface, upon
which I bring to bear the appropriate package of
recognitional and identificatory skills. Seeing-as helps to
account for the content of a representational picture, but it
does not explain its nature or its existence.
10. This discussion of representational meaning in the
pictorial arts is one thread in a larger argument for the
experiential nature of aesthetic meaning, and that is
something, you may feel, that is still far from being
established. For how about, on the one hand, other forms of
pictorial meaning than the representational, and, on the other
hand, other forms of aesthetic meaning than the pictorial?
On the first topic, I can do no more than refer you to
Painting as an Art, where I go to some lengths to show that
there are other forms of pictorial meaning than the
representational that are heavily dependent on the
repesentational. Additionally there is the general warning
which is never out of place that, if representation is
understood as I understand it - that is, as the correlative to
seeing-in - it is a far broader phenomenon than it is
generally taken to be. For instance, it includes nearly all




On the second topic, if there is also a prejudice to remove,
it might be thought that it is a prejudice that I have done
more than my fair share to reinforce.
I must explain.
II. Earlier on, I made a sharp contrast between meaning in
painting and linguistic meaning. and I took meaning in
painting to be prototypical experiential meaning. You may
well think that this contrast, which advanced my argument so
long as we were thinking primarily of the visual arts, will now
return to plague my case. For once we come to the literary
arts, the case for experiential meaning in that area lapses, and
lapses of necessity, for surely the kind of meaning that we
encounter in a poem, or in a novel. or in a play. is of the very
kind that I set up as a foil to experiential meaning. It is
meaning of a kind that is not just like linguistic meaning, it is
linguistic meaning.
The objection fails. because it is based on a confusion.
Literary works of art do indeed possess linguistic meaning,
but this is not the meaning at issue. What is at issue is literary
meaning, which is the kind of aesthetic meaning that works of
literature possess. To grasp the linguistic meaning of a
literary work of art is - issues of translation apart - a
precondition of grasping its literary meaning, but it is not
identical with doing so. The unfortunate gallicism,
widespread in critical circles, of referring to poems. novels,
plays as 'texts', when texts are merely the vehicles of literary
works of art, encourages the confusion that we understand the
literary work of art when the linguistic decipherment of its
text is over.
So interrelated questions arise. What is it to grasp the
literary meaning of a work of literature? How does the
literary meaning of a literary work of art differ from its
linguistic meaning? And is there any good reason to think of




To attempt an answer to the question, I shall narrow the
context to that of one kind of literary work of art, the novel,
and I shall start by considering, from the points of view both
of agent and reader, an activity which is, not just a simple
version of the novel, but is something simpler than the novel:
I call it telling - that is, merely telling - a story, and the
relevant contrast will be between merely telling a story and
constructing a narrative: the latter attains to the status of the
novel.
So long as an agent - he is as yet no artist - confines
himself to merely telling a story, all that he is committed to
doing is to try to put the story across as effectively as
possible, and the sole commitment on the part of the reader,
which in tum is a commitment solely to himself, is to get the
most out of the story. To this end the reader can bring his
imagination to bear upon what he reads or hears in an
unfettered fashion. The meaning of the story is independent
of any experiences that he has, nor is his grasp of the story
reflected in the experiences he has in taking it in.
The transition from the mere telling of a story to the
construction of a narrative is effected when the agent, in
carrying out the intention of telling a story, forms further
intentions about how to tell the story. And, note, his concern
with how to tell the story is not a subsidiary motivation, as it
would be if he were concerned to impress the reader with the
size of his vocabulary, it is now for him an integral aspect of
telling the story. Different ways of telling the story no longer
amount for him, as they did for the mere storyteller, to
different ways of doing the same thing: they are now
different things to do. This is because his concern is now with
the story as told.
There are a number of ways in which telling a story can
come to differentiate a narrative.
First of all, the story might be told straight through from
the beginning to the end, or it might be broken up into parts,
and, when it is, only certain parts might be narrated, or the
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parts might be narrated not in the order in which they took
place.
Secondly, the story might be narrated from an internal, or
from an external, point of view. When it is told externally, it
might be told from a narrator's point of view, or from no
point of view. When it is told internally, it will be told from
the point of view of a character, but the character might
remain constant, or change at crucial moments, or fluctuate
continuously.
Thirdly, parts of the story might be, not just omitted, but
concealed, or the story might be told deceptively. Now the
narrative cannot be grasped unless the novelist's motivation is
inferred from the text.
Fourthly, some parts of the story, or some characters in the
story, may be presented with greater favour than others. Now
the narrative takes sides, for the novelist has inserted his
sympathies, directly or indirectly, into the narrative.
However, as mere storytelling modulates into constructing
a narrative, as the novel evolves, it is not only in the intentions
of the novelist that this shift is registered. It is also registered
in the appropriate responses of the reader. These may be
divided into two.
The reader must first determine which aspects of the text
he is confronted with result from any of the foregoing
decisions, and then he must react accordingly.
And reacting accordingly can in tum be thought of as
having two aspects to it: one negative, the other positive.
In the first place, the reader must rein in the imagination,
which was not asked of him before, for, if he does not, he
runs the risk of riding roughshod over the novelist's
intentions.
Secondly, the reader must react to what the novelist has
prepared for him in the way the novelist expects him to: if,
that is to say, he can. In other words, he is not at fault if he
fails to react as the novelist expects him to if the novelist in
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turn has failed to make this a reasonable way for a suitably
sensitive, suitably informed reader to respond to the text.
However, when the reader can and does react in conformity
with the novelist's intentions, the experiences that he has are
his way of grasping the narrative, hence of understanding the
novel. Now the reader's experiences, like the correct
perceptions of the suitably sensitive, suitably informed
spectator in front of a painting, act as constitutive of the
meaning of the work with which he is engaged.
I hope that I have said enough to show how a case can be
made out for thinking that meaning in arts other than the
visual can also be properly regarded as experiential. Which is
not to say that there won't be big differences between the arts
in the matter of what it is to be experiential.
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